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1 
ABSTRACT 
The threat of deepfakes is well-documented in the existing literature. Deepfake           
technology has emerged as a powerful tool with which vulnerable individuals could            
easily become targets of novel forms of exploitation and sabotage. Additionally,           
deepfakes’ unique capacity to distort people’s sense of reality exacerbates truth decay.            
The growing influence of social media and our deep-rooted cognitive biases further            
escalate the harms of deepfakes. Despite these apparent concerns, scholars have noted            
that the regulation of deepfakes confronts a constitutional challenge in the American            
context, stemming from Supreme Court cases such as ​New York Times v. Sullivan and              
U.S. v. Alvarez. ​In both cases, the Court emphasized the importance of protecting false              
speech on the grounds that it constitutes an integral part of the “marketplace of ideas.”               
This paper aims to show how the broad range of harms posed by deepfakes in the digital                 
age calls for a departure from employing the ​Times ​and ​Alvarez ​approaches to assessing              
the constitutionality of deepfakes.  
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Introduction 
The word “deepfake” is a portmanteau of “deep learning” and “fake” (Rouse,            
2020). It refers to a type of artificial intelligence (AI) technology that incorporates a              
machine learning technique called generative adversarial networks (GANs) (Rouse,         
2020). GANs was first introduced in 2014 by Ian Goodfellow and other researchers at the               
University of Montreal (Goodfellow et al, 2014). The idea is to use a pair of neural                
networks – one of which is called the “generator,” and the other, the “discriminator” – to                
synthesize artificial media or multimedia content that is indistinguishable from its           
authentic counterpart (Brownlee, 2019). One of the most striking features of this            
algorithmic architecture is its ability to use as little as one image of a person to create a                  
video clip of that person saying or doing things they never said or did in real life (Libby,                  
2019). 
In recent years, deepfake technology has earned its reputation as a threat to our              
already vulnerable information ecosystem (Schwartz, 2018). Until late 2017, the use of            
this machine learning technique was mostly confined to the area of AI research             
(Schwartz, 2018). It was only when a Reddit user who, under the moniker “Deepfakes,”              
began posting digitally altered pornographic videos in which celebrities’ faces were           
superimposed onto the bodies of women in pornographic movies, that this technology            
became widely known in the public domain (Schwartz, 2018). By the time Reddit later              
banned the posting and dissemination of deepfakes from its platform, the creator of the              
videos had released “FakeApp,” an easy-to-use platform for making forged media           
(Schwartz, 2018). With the help of FakeApp, deepfake technology became widely known            
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and available to the public, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of individuals               
who utilized this technology to generate and disseminate deepfakes online, mainly           
through social media platforms (Schwartz, 2018). In September 2019, the AI firm            
Deeptrace found approximately 15,000 deepfake videos online, 96% of which were           
pornographic (Sample, 2020). 
The goal of this paper is to provide an in-depth assessment of this disruptive              
technology in order to construct a more robust framework for evaluating whether            
deepfakes should be protected under the category of “false speech.” The paper proceeds             
as follows: Part I discusses the ways in which deepfakes present an unprecedented threat              
to individuals and to society. Part II explains how false speech has come to be viewed as                 
a form of speech that warrants a degree of protection and why deepfakes, due to the novel                 
threats they pose, should not fall under this particular category of speech. Part III              
discusses the importance of distinguishing malicious deepfakes from satire and parody in            
that the latter two are legally permissible and socially valuable types of speech, while              
malicious deepfakes assume deliberate deception. Finally, Part IV summarizes some of           
the legal and constitutional challenges that need to be overcome in order to bring about               
constructive and lasting changes with regard to the looming threat of deepfakes.  
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PART I: THE PROBLEM OF DEEPFAKES 
Why are deepfakes dangerous? 
In response to the extensive use of deepfake technology in the realm of             
pornography and increasingly elsewhere, many scholars, especially in the areas of law            
and policy, have voiced their concerns about the potential for deepfakes to become             
powerful mechanisms to exploit and sabotage others, as well as to harm society by              
disrupting democratic discourse on important policy questions (Libby, 2019). Moreover,          
recent events, such as the Russian intervention in the 2016 presidential election,            
combined with the growing risk of cyberwar escalation, have placed the issue of             
evaluating the danger of deepfakes at the top of many organizations’ agendas, including             
those of some of the largest social media networks, such as Twitter and Facebook              
(Ghaffary, 2020; Romm, Harvwell, Stanley-Becker, 2020). 
One of the most seminal works in this area of concern is a paper titled “Deep                
Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security,” written by            
Danielle Citron, a professor of law at Boston University, and her colleague Bobby             
Chesney. In the paper, Citron and Chesney (2018) explore a number of ways in which               
deepfakes could cause harm not only to individuals but also to society at large. With an                
emphasis on the findings of Citron and Chesney (2018), the rest of Part I aims to (1)                 
summarize the general view among scholars on the danger of deepfake technology, (2)             
discuss the role of social media and confirmation bias in enhancing the danger of              
misinformation, especially during a time of crisis, and (3) introduce how the issue of free               
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speech presents constitutional challenges against efforts to regulate the circulation of           
deepfakes. 
Citron and Chesney (2018) begin their discussion on the many harms of deepfake             
technology by focusing on deepfakes’ capacity to serve as powerful mechanisms to            
exploit and sabotage others. In particular, they warn of the possibility of deepfakes             
escalating the severity of rape threats by giving off the impression that victims can be               
sexually abused at whim (Citron and Chesney, 2018). Even more problematic, the targets             
of various forms of nonconsensual pornography made possible by deepfakes tend to be             
disproportionately female as well as disproportionately queer, rendering such types of           
digital manipulation especially dangerous to some of the most vulnerable groups within            
society (Franks and Waldman, 2019). The authors further argue that even if a deepfake              
video involves no sexual violence, any kind of abuse illustrated can be exploited to              
threaten, intimidate, and inflict psychological harm on the individual depicted or those            
who care for that individual’s safety (Citron and Chesney, 2018). Citron and Chesney             
(2018) also examine how deepfake technology can be used to tarnish a person’s             
reputation by portraying the person in a negative light in the presence of his or her rivals.                 
For instance, a malicious agent could falsely implicate a person by creating fake evidence              
using deepfake technology. The agent could then make the depicted person sustain            
serious damage, whether it be reputational, financial, or psychological, by sharing the            
deepfake with the person’s rivals (Citron and Chesney, 2018). 
In addition to describing the extent to which deepfake technology can harm            
individuals through exploitation and sabotage, Citron and Chesney (2018) discuss the           
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distinct possibility of deepfakes causing considerable harm to society. To begin with,            
they argue that the threat posed by deepfakes at a societal level involves systemic              
dimensions, for the damage caused by deepfakes may undermine efforts to maintain the             
wellbeing of democratic institutions. They point to the intervention of the Russian            
government in the 2016 U.S. presidential election as compelling evidence of how foreign             
actors can seriously destabilize democratic discourse by exploiting the capacity of           
deepfakes to distort factual information and thus manipulate beliefs – on the grounds that              
one of the key ingredients for sustainable democratic discourse is “a shared universe of              
facts and truths” backed by empirical evidence (Citron and Chesney, 2018). 
Yet, the level of harm deepfakes pose to society extends beyond merely            
disrupting democratic discourse. When debates on questions of policy become infused           
with deliberate falsehoods transmitted by malicious agents, voters’ ability to make           
informed, rational decisions about candidates running for an office of any sort is             
unequivocally damaged. On this point, Manzi (2019) suggests that voters’ susceptibility           
to falsities disrupts their ability to choose candidates who represent their interests. In the              
current legal atmosphere, whether such disruptions amount to a legitimate case of            
electoral fraud or vote rigging would be difficult to demonstrate, and it would be even               
more difficult to bring the actors involved to justice – as we saw in the case of the                  
Russian intervention. Another reason assigning commensurate responsibility in this         
regard presents challenges is that the constitutionality of false speech in the context of the               
First Amendment has long been regarded as a highly contextual matter by the courts – a                
consideration that will be elaborated upon in Part II. Nonetheless, the notion that             
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deepfakes, by disrupting people’s sense of reality, have the capacity to influence public             
opinion and thus destabilize our democratic institutions seems highly plausible and           
therefore warrants further scrutiny. 
The role of social media and confirmation bias 
When discussing the dangers associated with deepfakes, it is also important to            
understand how the nature of today’s communication environment, combined with the           
effects of cognitive bias on how people perceive information of unknown accuracy,            
enhances the capacity of deep fakes to cause serious harm. With respect to today’s              
communication environment, for instance, we are seeing a sharp decline in traditional            
media such as newspapers, television, and radio in favor of social media as the main               
source of news (Manzi, 2019). According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research              
Center in 2019, 55% of U.S. adults get their news from social media either “often” or                
“sometimes,” and 88% of Americans recognize that social media companies have some            
control over the mix of news that people consume each day (Suciu, 2019). The reason               
such a shift towards social media presents challenges with respect to the circulation of              
deepfakes is that social media networks, unlike traditional news organizations, do not            
operate under the principle of safeguarding democracy or enabling truth-seeking in the            
ideas of the marketplace (Manzi, 2018). It has been argued that the attention-grabbing             
algorithms underlying social media play a significant role in propelling malicious actors            
to inject social media networks with misinformation to sow confusion, political discord,            
prejudice, and chaos (Deibert, 2019). Fournier (2020), for example, writes that social            
media has enabled foreign intelligence agencies and entities to “covertly inject           
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disinformation through the use of highly searched hashtags, keywords, and precise           
timing.” 
The power of social media in facilitating the spread of misinformation was            
recently underscored by the novel COVID-19 outbreak. Alarmed by the amount of            
harmful memes and misinformation related to the outbreak on social media platforms like             
Twitter and Facebook, Michigan State University’s Communication Arts and Sciences          
professors conducted a close analysis of the situation. They concluded that the outbreak             
has caused an “Infodemic” and that social media in particular has created conditions ripe              
for misinformation to prevail (Priebe, 2020). Professor Dustin Carnahan attributes this           
phenomenon to some of social media’s most prominent features. He suggests that            
because interactions on social media usually occur between people who have personal            
connections or among those who admire or respect one another, people are less likely to               
question the believability of what they see (Priebe, 2020). He further claims that the viral               
and unfiltered nature of social media enables information to spread without extensive            
scrutiny by credible sources. 
One notable example of misinformation related to COVID-19 involves President          
Trump’s passing comment during a press briefing about using ultraviolet light inside the             
human body or a disinfectant by “injection” as a treatment for COVID-19 (Panetta,             
2020). Because social media is often used to quickly pass along statements made by              
public officials or well-known celebrities, even if doing so risks the dissemination of             
misinformation to a sizable audience, President Trump’s rather “spontaneous” suggestion          
was instantly shared through various social media platforms. Although President Trump           
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phrased his suggestion as “it’d be interesting to check” rather than a clear             1
recommendation based on science and facts, the extraordinary rate at which social media             
users were sharing this comment caused a large number of people to falsely believe that               
the President was telling people to inject themselves with bleach or isopropyl alcohol             
(Mahadevan, 2020). Although scientific experts and medical professionals were quick to           
repudiate the efficacy of such courses of action, within hours of the President’s             
suggestion, there were already reports indicating a spike in New Yorkers ingesting            
household cleaners, demonstrating the power of information, let alone misinformation,          
coming from public figures with considerable influence (Sanders & Sommerfeldt, 2020). 
During emergency situations, people have a natural tendency to rely on           
authoritative knowledge when forming judgments on how to protect themselves from           
potential dangers (Petryna, 2002). When people’s susceptibility to become less prudent in            
their judgment in the face of uncertainty is enmeshed with a disruptive technology that              
enables individuals to become subjugated to a false sense of reality, the extent of the               
harm deepfakes can pose grows exponentially. As an illustration, consider the           
hypothetical scenario in which a malicious agent decides to employ deepfake technology            
to create and disseminate fake videos of political leaders or well-known medical            
professionals making dangerous suggestions with respect to COVID-19 – perhaps to           
sabotage the reputations of those portrayed in the deepfakes or to sow distrust, confusion,              
and panic among the public. Under this scenario, the unprecedented pace at which             
1 Trump’s exact words during the April 23, 2020 coronavirus briefing: “I see the disinfectant, 
where it knocks it out in one minute…And is there a way we can do something like that by injection inside 
or almost a cleaning because you see it gets in the lungs and it does a tremendous number on the lungs, so 
it’d be interesting to check that so that you’re going to have to use medical doctors with, but it sounds 
interesting to me” (Mahadevan, 2020). 
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misinformation disseminates, coupled with the possibility of such misinformation         
resulting in life-threatening decisions, could introduce a magnitude of harm that would be             
neither quantifiable nor controllable.  
Given that, as of December 2019, there are approximately 3 billion active social             
media users, which amounts to almost half of the entire world population, it is reasonable               
to speculate that deepfakes’ unique capacity to blur the line between fact and fiction can               
cause significant harm. This is particularly true in the domains of health and science              
where conflicting claims and mixed messaging can expose people to a wide range of              
risks, as evidenced by President Trump’s ​suggestion about injecting disinfectants as           
treatment for COVID-19 rapidly turning into a ​recommendation​, unbeknown to the           
speaker himself, after a series of reposts and spins made possible by the viral and               
unfiltered nature of social media. (Clement, 2020). Another factor that makes the            
unchecked proliferation of deepfakes especially dangerous is people’s susceptibility to          
information that align with their preexisting beliefs, a tendency known as “confirmation            
bias” (Casad, 2019). The idea is that people have difficulty processing information in a              
rational, unbiased manner once they have formed an opinion about an issue (Casad,             
2019). In other words, when presented with information of unknown accuracy, an            
individual will generally respond based on his or her preconceived notions rather than on              
empirical evidence (Sunstein, 2019). Cass Sunstein, a professor at Harvard Law School,            
argues that the effects of confirmation bias are especially dangerous when the            
information presented is false in that “once a false rumor has thus been accepted, a               
correction then becomes difficult to accept” (Sunstein, 2019). In the same vein, Erza             
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Waldman (2018), a professor at New York Law School, contends that false information             
can harden biases, which increases polarization. This has the effect of eroding trust in              
traditional reporting and encouraging the selection of information that confirms one’s           
biases. Considering how well deepfakes can distort reality by generating content with real             
people saying and doing things they never said or did, the pervasive effects of              
confirmation bias paint a grim picture of the scope of harm deepfakes could cause. 
The issue of free speech 
At first glance, the costs of allowing deepfakes to freely roam around social media              
platforms may seem to justify some degree of regulation to prevent further harm. Upon              
further examination, however, one becomes cognizant of the broader significance of           
deepfakes as a form of “false speech” whose constitutionality is still being debated             
among legal scholars. Part II seeks to explain how false speech has come to be               
recognized as a form of speech that warrants a degree of protection under the First               
Amendment. Relevant Supreme Court cases will be reviewed, followed by a discussion            
on how deepfakes, due to their unprecedented capacity to undermine free debates and             
manipulate views that are critical to maintaining the democratic value of elections,            
ultimately call for a different, less conventional approach to understanding the           
constitutional value of false speech, especially ​harmful​ false speech, in the digital age. 
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PART II: DEEPFAKES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The free speech argument ​against​ the regulation of deepfakes 
The most frequently used reasoning against the regulation of deepfakes is that            
they, despite their inherent falsity, implicate freedom of expression (Hall, 2018). In fact,             
despite broad consensus on the need to address deepfakes and their growing influence,             
many scholars have been keen to point out the possibility of such efforts going too far.                
For example, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Policy Director for New America’s Open           
Technology Institute warned that we must “avoid establishing legal rules that will push             
too far in the opposite direction, and engage in censorship of free expression online”              
(Franklin, 2019). Similarly, David Greene, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s civil          
liberties director, said that California’s new political deepfake law, which makes it illegal             
for individuals to post manipulated content that give a “false impression of a political              
candidate’s actions or words” in the 60 days before an election, is “overbroad, vague, and               
subjective” and fails to strike an appropriate balance between preventing harm and            
protecting the value of free speech (Fischer, 2019). Tsukayama, McKinney, and           2
Williams (2019) also advised against rushing to regulate deepfakes, claiming that while it             
is important for society to acknowledge the harmful uses of deepfakes and hold the              
people who cause them liable for their behaviors, it needs to do so in a way that does not                   
censor lawful and socially valuable speech – a point of contention that will be further               
examined in Part III. 
2 In October 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed two deepfake bills into state law. 
The first legislation makes it illegal to post manipulated videos and pictures that give a “false impression of 
a political candidate’s actions or words” in the 60 days before an election. The second legislation allows 
residents to sue anyone who uses deepfake technology to place them in pornographic material without their 
consent (Fischer, 2019). 
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The value of false speech under “the marketplace of ideas” 
Even though the Supreme Court has yet to evaluate the constitutionality of            
regulating deepfakes specifically, the Court has made several decisions involving the           
issue of “false speech” – granted, with some inconsistencies (Chemerinsky, 2018). For            
example, ​NYT v. Sullivan (1964) established that false political speech enjoys           
constitutional protection insofar as its prohibition would chill truthful speech, rendering           
the regulation of false speech particularly challenging. Delivering for the majority           
opinion of the Court, Justice William Brennan wrote that the decision was predicated             
upon “the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on              
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964).            
The Court explained that false statements, in this regard, are inevitable and thus must be               
protected if freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they need to               
survive (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964). Moreover, Justice Brennan wrote that defendants can            
only be required to pay damages to a public official for libel if a plaintiff is able to show                   
that there was “actual malice,” – that is, knowledge that the claim was false or reckless                
disregard as to the falsity of the statement (NYT v. Sullivan, 1964). The court, by               
emphatically rejecting that falsity alone suffices as a basis to deny First Amendment             
protection, especially when the speech in question is a political one, established a             
powerful precedent with respect to how false political speech should be viewed in the              
context of First Amendment law. 
The Court’s reference to the significance of an “uninhibited, robust, and           
wide-open debate” embodies one of the most influential governing principles in First            
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Amendment law: the “marketplace of ideas.” Conceived by John Stuart Mill and later             
incorporated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissenting opinion in ​Abrams v.             
United States ​(1919), the marketplace of ideas is the belief that “the test of the truth or                 
acceptance of ideas depends on their competition with one another and not on the opinion               
of a censor, whether one provided by the government or by some other authority”              
(Hudson, 2017). In line with this reasoning, the court has come to view false speech as                
providing a necessary condition under which true opinions can ascertain “the truth”            
(Manzi, 2019). ​U.S. v. Alvarez (2012) is a more recent case in which the Court utilized                
the marketplace of ideas metaphor to place false opinions under the category of protected              
speech under the First Amendment. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the plurality            
opinion, concluded that false statements can be regulated only to the extent that             
defendants intend to cause “legally cognizable harm” and that a direct causal link exists              
between the “restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented” (U.S. v. Alvarez, 2012).              
The value of false opinions was highlighted once again in Susan B. Anthony List v.               
Driehaus (2014), in which the Court recognized the harms of an Ohio law that              
criminalized making false statements about candidates during political campaigns. 
Despite the Court’s repeated emphasis on the value of false speech in the context              
of the marketplace of ideas, the Court has also argued that false statements “are not               
protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements” (Brown v.              
Hartlage, 1982). In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell (1988), the Court held that “false              
statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the           
truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.” A similar view was articulated in the              
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Court’s earlier Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) decision, in which it asserted that no               
false statement has constitutional value in that “neither the intentional lie nor the careless              
error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate           
on public issues.” Chemerinsky (2018) explains that the apparent inconsistency in how            
the court has dealt with cases related to false speech is inevitable, because any analysis               
regarding false speech “must be contextual” and must reflect the “balancing of competing             
interests.” The Court’s ​actual malice standard, which gives false political speech greater            
protection in defamation cases, exemplifies how the Court has come to engage in a              
contextual analysis of determining whether a speaker’s statement should be protected,           
despite its falsity, under the First Amendment (New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964). 
The limitations of conventional free speech discourse 
When one examines the ways in which the Supreme Court has constructed and             
redefined the American tradition of free speech, especially regarding censorship, it is            
evident that deepfakes do not fall nicely into the categories of speech that the court has                
deliberated over throughout history (Kalven, 1988). Because deepfake technology is a           
relatively new invention of the 21​st century and its true impact is yet to be revealed, it is                  
important to understand how deepfakes differ from other types of protected and            
unprotected categories of speech. This evaluation will provide helpful reference points           
from which we can assess the ability of deepfakes to enhance or undermine the              
truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas. 
Responding to the assertion that deepfakes fall under the category of “false            
speech,” mainly in the context of ​NYT v. Sullivan ​and U.S. v. Alvarez​, and thus warrant                
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constitutional protection as a valid form of false speech, the first two sections of Part II                
have illustrated how false speech has come to be viewed as a form of speech that, for the                  
most part, deserves constitutional protection as long as it does not present imminent and              
verifiable harm. Nonetheless, many technology, policy, and law experts have emphasized           
the need to evaluate deepfake technology in a new light due to its ability to diffuse                
rapidly through social media platforms (Citron and Chesney, 2018). In particular,           
scholars have pointed out the outdatedness of placing deepfakes in the same category of              
“false statements” described in previous court cases (Citron and Chesney, 2018;           
Chemerinsky, 2018; Manzi, 2019). Citron and Chesney (2018) illustrate how deepfakes’           
capacity to introduce unprecedented forms of exploitation, intimidation, and personal          
sabotage, as well as their ability to distort democratic discourse and manipulate public             
opinion, provide convincing reasons to consider whether the benefits of enabling           
deepfakes to circulate unchecked online outweigh the broad range of harm they pose to              
individuals and to society. Similar arguments have been made by researchers and            
academics who are increasingly wary of deepfakes’ ability to produce multimedia content            
that is deliberately deceptive yet hardly distinguishable from its authentic counterpart. A            
Brookings Institution report suggests that, because deepfakes are so realistic, they can            
exert a considerable amount of influence over our “understanding of truth” (Villasenor,            
2019). The report explains that by exploiting our inclination to trust the credibility of              
information we see with our own eyes, deepfakes can transform complete fiction into             
apparent reality or vice versa, resulting in a world where “truth itself becomes elusive,              
because we can no longer be sure of what is real and what is not” (Villasenor, 2019). 
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Referring to ​NYT v. Sullivan​, Sunstein posits that the idea of democracy is a              
“double-edged sword” (Sunstein, 2019). The hypothetical scenario he provides involves a           
speaker intentionally lying about a politician and destroying her reputation in the process.             
In Sunstein’s view, allowing this kind of harmful speech is not consistent with the idea               
that speakers need “breathing space” to preserve an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”            
system of free expression in which speakers and writers are not deterred by the prospect               
of lawsuits (Sunstein, 2019). Sunstein argues that unintentional mistakes, which may           
occur when one engages in open democratic debates, are fundamentally different from            
purposeful attempts to distort known facts. This further illuminates how deepfakes, which            
constitute a form of deliberate deception, would not be protected under ​NYT vs. Sullivan              
and that simply encouraging “more speech” as suggested by the marketplace of ideas is              
not the be-all and end-all when it comes to preserving a healthy democratic space for               
individuals to freely share their views with others (Waldman, 2019). 
Chemerinsky (2018) also suggests that when the speech is false, the assumption            
that more speech is inherently better is less convincing; his reasoning can be summarized              
as follows: (1) ​Speech is protected partly because of the belief that the marketplace of               
ideas is the best way for truth to emerge. (2) ​The harmful effects of false speech ​infect the                  
marketplace, and there is no reason to believe people will be able to discern facts from                
falsities. In accordance with his views, the advent of the internet and social media, which               
has enabled relatively unrestrained, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds, has            
lent further credence to the apparent limitations of the assumption that “more speech” is              
inherently better.  
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The documented harms of deepfakes and their unique capacity to disseminate           
deliberately altered content to a sizable audience shed light on how deepfakes differ in              
their purpose and magnitude from the kinds of false speech the Court has come to protect                
through cases such as ​NYT v. Sullivan and ​U.S. v. Alvarez​. At the most basic level,                
deepfakes are the embodiment of highly advanced forms of deception made possible by             
artificial intelligence technology in the digital age. Just by this fact alone, actual malice              
would not be difficult to prove, as long as the disseminators of the deepfakes in question                
are either the creators themselves or are fully aware that the material they are distributing               
are deepfakes. The component of demonstrating “legally cognizable harm” and showing           
that a causal link exists between the regulation of deepfakes and the prevention of injury ,                
however, would be much more challenging, considering that the scope of harm deepfakes             
pose is not limited to individuals but covers a wide variety of audiences. In fact, the                
greater harm lies in deepfakes’ ability to threaten democratic discourse altogether.           
Because the rise of social media, combined with the effects of confirmation bias, has              
rendered democratic processes especially vulnerable to misinformation and        
disinformation, it is important to recognize that the conventional rationale for protecting            
false speech may – rather than strengthening the marketplace of ideas – ironically             
undermine the kinds of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open interactions the marketplace           
of ideas serves to protect.   
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PART III: MALICIOUS DEEPFAKES VS. SATIRE AND PARODY – WHAT’S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
Although the harms of deepfakes are widely recognized and the notion that            
deepfakes should be protected as a form of false speech exposes serious legal limitations              
in addressing these harms, one needs to bear in mind that prohibiting the use of deepfakes                
altogether may risk censoring lawful and socially valuable speech, such as parodies and             
satires. Consider the following hypothetical scenario, which helps to shed light on the             
rationale behind the need to distinguish malicious deepfakes from deepfakes that may be             
used legally as a tool to satirize or parody certain aspects of society or the government                
(HG.org). 
Let us assume that an avid supporter of Joe Biden, the leading Democratic             
candidate for the 2020 U.S. presidential election, decides to create a deepfake video of              
President Trump admitting to accusations against him as a way to ​satirize the fact that the                
President, despite much evidence in support of his involvement in numerous corruption            
scandals, has consistently denied his role. If this video were to circulate around social              
media under the guise of an authentic recording, that would amount to a legitimate case               
of libel, which is punishable by law. However, if the creator of this deepfake decides to                
clearly label the video as a deepfake in order to prevent its viewers from confusing the                
fake content as the truth, his or her malicious intent is substantially nullified. At that               
point, the question of liability for the deepfake and its potential negative consequences             
becomes less obvious.  
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Moreover, if we assume that the creator of the Trump deepfake leveraged the             
unique capacities of deepfake technology, not to deliberately deceive its viewers, but to             
simply increase the efficacy and reachability of his satirical message, limiting this kind of              
use becomes even more concerning. Although malicious deepfakes are fundamentally          
different from the kinds of false speech protected under ​NYT v. Sullivan and ​U.S. v.               
Alvarez​, if deepfake technology were to be incorporated as a tool to satirize or parody the                
government, and the creator labels their work as a deepfake, the resulting deepfake would              
reasonably be protected as a socially valuable speech in the context of First Amendment              
law. The discrepancies that exist even within the category of deepfakes further illustrates             
the highly contextual nature of determining the limits of free speech protections, as             
suggested by Chereminsky (2018).  
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PART IV: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As illustrated in Part III, indiscriminately prohibiting all forms of deepfakes may            
compromise socially valuable speech, such as parodies and satires. However, in response            
to growing concerns over the spread of misinformation ahead of the 2020 presidential             
election, many social media companies are implementing new policies to detect and            
remove content that has been deliberately altered and is likely to cause serious damage.  
Notably, Twitter recently began applying a label to tweets containing synthetic or            
deliberately altered forms of media (Paul, 2020). The company also said it would actively              
remove any intentionally misleading manipulated content that is likely to cause harm            
(e.g. content that could cause violence, voter suppression, or privacy violations) (Paul,            
2020). Moreover, Alphabet Inc’s YouTube said it would remove any content that has             
been technically manipulated or doctored and may pose a “serious risk of egregious             
harm” (Paul, 2020). Similarly, Facebook announced its plan to ban certain manipulated            
photos and videos from its platform. It is important to note, however, that Facebook              
explicitly exempted content that is parody or satire from its new policy to combat the               
spread of deepfakes, further illustrating the need to clearly distinguish the use of             
deepfakes for the purpose of satire or parody from other malicious uses. For the most               
part, the actions that many social media companies are taking to combat the growing              
problem with deepfakes on the internet is promising as it brings awareness and, therefore,              
prudence to those who continue to seek robust ways to manage malicious deepfakes             
online.  
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However, social media companies’ preventative policies are insufficient to         
safeguard democratic institutions from the spread of misinformation and disinformation          
in the digital age. In addition to the protections conferred by the First Amendment, the               
“fair use” ​doctrine in copyright law, and section 230 of the Communications Decency             3
Act (CDA) provide ample room for malicious actors to continue infecting online            4
communication networks with harmful deepfakes. 
Some legal scholars have suggested that amending section 230 of CDA, which            
shields social media companies from liability for unlawful user-generated content as long            
as they take reasonable steps to prevent or address unlawful content posted by their users,               
would be a prudent way to comprehensively address the ways in which online content is               
published and distributed. Although amending section 230 of CDA so that social media             
companies are no longer immune from liability could certainly incentivize social media            
companies to discourage users from spreading misinformation and disinformation, Manzi          
(2018) suggests that this move alone would not eliminate the issue of fake news and               
deepfakes online. Manzi (2018) points to the actual malice standard as proof, in that              
while false speech that harms ​specific individuals would subject re-publishers to liability,            
false speech that causes ​general​ harm is currently unactionable. 
3 ​“Fair use” doctrine in copyright law is a legal doctrine that promotes freedom of expression by 
permitting the unlicensed use of copyright-protected works in certain circumstances. Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act provides the statutory framework for determining whether something is a fair use and 
identifies certain types of uses – such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and 
research – as examples of activities that may qualify as fair use (​U.S. Copyright Office​, 2020). 
 
4  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which was passed in 1996, says an 
“interactive computer service” can’t be treated as the publisher or speaker of third-party content. This 
protects websites from lawsuits If a user posts something illegal, although there are exceptions for 
copyright violations, sex work-related material, and violations of federal criminal law (​Newton​, 2020). 
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Above all, the biggest obstacle to combating the spread of deepfakes seems to lie              
in the strong constitutional framework around false speech, especially false political           
speech, whose constitutional value within the marketplace of ideas framework is           
explicated in ​NYT v. Sullivan​. Considering deepfakes’ deliberately deceptive nature and           
the unique harms they pose to democratic processes, it is reasonable to believe that              
deepfakes should not be assessed using the same kind of rationale employed in ​NYT v.               
Sullivan and ​U.S. v. Alvarez​. Nonetheless, until there is a serious reconsideration or             
perhaps a reversal of the Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of false speech,              
statutes criminalizing malicious and false speech would not be able to withstand the             
constitutional challenge rooted in the actual malice standard, as well as the ​Alavarez             
requirements that the speech causes “legally cognizable harm” and a direct causal link             
exists between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented” (NYT v. Sullivan;              
U.S. v. Alvarez). 
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CONCLUSION 
Discussing the value of free speech in conjunction with the use of artificial             
intelligence technology such as deepfake technology is a relatively new phenomenon. As            
illustrated in the paper, there are numerous complexities and limitations involved in            
striking a balance between protecting the valuable uses of deepfake technology and            
regulating those that cause considerable harm not only to individuals but to society as a               
whole. In particular, the outdatedness of using the rationales articulated in ​NYT v.             
Sullivan ​and ​U.S. v. Alvarez regarding the value of false speech presents constitutional             
challenges against efforts to curb the threat of malicious deepfakes. 
As difficult as this task may seem, the stakes of constructing a more             
comprehensive and robust legal framework are growing exponentially as technology          
continues to progress and reshape our societies. That said, a reconsideration of ​NYT v.              
Sullivan and ​U.S. v. Alvarez is necessary in order to distinguish deepfakes and other types               
of digitally manipulated content from the kind of false speech referred to in these cases.               
One way this can be done is by delineating the specific contexts in which deepfakes can                
be effectively regulated. In particular, the paper recommends that future research focus            
on how malicious deepfakes fundamentally differ from deepfakes that are used for            
socially valuable purposes and possibly come up with ways to further differentiate the             
myriad uses of deepfakes beyond the one presented in this research.  
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